





































































































































Existing studies of the World income distribution decompose output di®erences across coun-
tries into a component due to di®erences in observed factors of production and a component
due to di®erences in overall e±ciency, or total factor productivity (TFP). These studies tend
to ¯nd that poor countries have relatively low TFP, i.e. they are ine±cient producers of
goods and services. Since total factor productivity is factor neutral, this means that poor
countries use all of their inputs ine±ciently. Indeed, by construction the e±ciencies of any
two factors, e.g. skilled and unskilled labor, are perfectly positively correlated. Figure 1
depicts the relationship between the e±ciencies of skilled and unskilled labor implied by the
TFP approach to cross-country di®erences in technology.
This paper investigates an alternative framework where, rather than an overall level of
total factor productivity, countries are characterized by di®erent e±ciencies of three di®erent
factors: skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital. Far from con¯rming the perfect positive
correlation predicted by the TFP approach, our evidence is strongly suggestive of a negative
correlation between the e±ciencies of skilled and unskilled labor (and between the e±ciencies
of capital and unskilled labor): countries that are the most e±cient users of skilled labor
and capital also tend to be the least e±cient users of unskilled labor. In other words, we ¯nd
that the cross-country pattern of relative e±ciencies looks more like Figure 2 than Figure 1.
It also turns out that relative e±ciencies are systematically related to relative factor
endowments: countries that are abundant in unskilled labor are relatively e±cient at using
unskilled labor, while skilled-labor rich countries are relatively e±cient at using skilled labor
and capital. This motivates us to propose and estimate a model of appropriate technol-
ogy, whereby ¯rms in each country optimally choose their technology from a large menu
of \blueprints." The choice of blueprint maps into a particular realization of the vector of
e±ciencies of the three inputs. Hence, ¯rms in countries with a relatively large endowment
of skilled workers will tend to choose skilled-labor (and capital) complementary technolo-
gies, while countries with more abundant unskilled labor will tend to operate unskilled-labor
complementary technologies. In selecting the optimal technology, each country's choice set
is bounded by a technological frontier, i.e. a locus of non-dominated technologies. Along this
frontier increases in the e±ciency of skilled labor and capital come at the cost of declines in
the e±ciency of unskilled labor. The observed negative correlations among the e±ciencies of
di®erent factors emerges as di®erent countries choose di®erent points along their frontiers.1
1Note that the TFP approach generally implies that there is a unique best technology: the one used by
1For the World as a whole, the location of this frontier depends on the current state
of technological knowledge. By introducing new blueprints that dominate some of the pre-
exisiting blueprints on the frontier, technological progress shifts this locus out. However, each
country's frontier might di®er from those of other countries for a variety of technological,
institutional, and perhaps even cultural idiosyncracies that lead to di®erences in the set of
blueprints countries can implement. Our model captures these di®erences by allowing for
country-speci¯c barriers to technology adoption. We ¯nd such barriers to be quantitatively
very important. The technology frontiers of low-income countries are estimated to generally
lie below the technology frontiers of high-income countries, indicating that { as in the TFP
approach { barriers to technology adoption remain an important determinant of di®erences
in per-capita income. Indeed, observed di®erences in endowments can account for an even
smaller share of the cross-country income variance than implied by the TFP approach. The
reason for this seemingly paradoxical result is that the appropriate choice of technology
dampens the e®ects of di®erences in factor endowments.
A variety of papers have argued that di®erent technologies may display di®erent de-
grees of skill- or unskill- bias. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992), Berman, Bound and
Griliches (1994), Kruger (1993), Acemoglu (1998), Caselli (1999), and several others have
made the skilled-labor bias of recently developed technologies the centerpiece of explanations
for the increase in wage inequality in many countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Also, Bartel
and Lichtenberg (1987), Dunne and Schmitz (1995), Allen (1996), Doms, Dunne and Troske
(1997), Dunne, Haltiwanger and Troske (1997), and others have documented with plant or
¯rm level data that relative employment and relative wages of skilled workers vary system-
atically with the type of technology used. The new facts we uncover suggest that something
similar is taking place at the country level.
The idea that countries with di®erent factor endowments will use di®erent technolo-
gies was ¯rst formalized by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969), who thus gave rise to a tradition on
\appropriate technology." This literature has been recently revived by Diwan and Rodrick
(1991), Basu and Weil (1998), and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999).2 Our contribution is
especially close to Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) in that both papers focus on the role of the
relative endowments of skilled and unskilled labor as the key determinant of each country's
appropriate technology. However, in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) developing countries are
the country with the highest level of TFP. In other words, in the space of e±ciency levels of di®erent inputs,
the technology frontier is a singleton, and all countries but one lie inside the frontier.
2See also Caselli and Coleman (1999), and Zeira (2000).
2forced to use the same technology as the developed ones - as R&D is targeted towards the
needs of the countries with a large endowment of skilled labor. Instead, in our model all
countries choose the technology most appropriate given their factor supplies.
The debate on the relative importance of factor endowments and productivity in ex-
plaining cross-country income di®erences started with Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and
featured contributions by, among others, Islam (1995), Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996),
Klenow and Rodriguez (1997), and Hall and Jones (1997). All these studies augment the
production function by human capital, and use a TFP approach to di®erences in technolo-
gies. The emerging view attributes to (unexplained) TFP di®erences roughly 50% of the
responsibility for GDP di®erences. Besides deviating from the TFP approach, our paper
di®ers from these contributions in that it models the choice of technology as depending on
observable inputs. As mentioned above, it turns out that this approach leads to a deepening
of the puzzle: di®erences in factor endowments explain an even smaller share of di®erences
in output.
Our paper is also closely related to work by Tre°er (1993), who has argued that
country-speci¯c augmentation of factor supplies (which can be interpreted as country-speci¯c
e±ciency levels) helps explain jointly the pattern of trade in factor services and cross-country
di®erences in factor prices. A by-product of his technique is a full set of estimates of e±ciency
levels for each country and each factor, i.e. something analogous to the set of estimates we
obtain. However, Tre°er's disaggregation of the labor aggregate is very di®erent from ours,
so the two sets of estimates are not easily compared. The two study, however, share the
basic conclusion that non-factor neutral technology di®erences across countries are critical
to ¯t international data.3
In Section 2 we present some initial evidence suggesting that countries are typically
observed to trade o® the e±ciency of one factor against another. In Section 3 we formalize
a model in which countries choose a technology from a technology frontier, and we estimate
this model using cross-country data on per-worker income, physical capital, skill-premia,
and labor endowments. We then discuss the implications of our estimates. In Section 4 we
perform a robustness check, and Section 5 concludes.
3See, however, Repetto and Ventura (1998) for an interesting critique of the Tre°er method.
32 Relative E±ciency of Inputs
The goal of this section is to uncover cross-country patterns in the behavior of the e±ciency
of unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital. Studies based on Cobb-Douglas speci¯cations
of production { for which there is no distinction between the e±ciency of the di®erent inputs
{ tend to show that overall e±ciency is highly positively correlated with per-capita income.
These ¯ndings are usually interpreted as showing that poorer countries use \backward,"
\inferior," or \inappropriate" technologies. In a more general framework in which di®erent
inputs are allowed to have di®erent e±ciencies, this interpretation would lead us to expect
poor countries to have low levels of e±ciency of all inputs relative to rich countries, or that
these levels of e±ciency are positively correlated across countries. In this section we present
some evidence that just the opposite might be true.
2.1 Measurement of Relative E±ciencies
To compute di®erent levels of e±ciency for di®erent inputs into production, we postulate
a production function of the form proposed by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante
(2000):
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where ¾<1a n d½<1. In equation (1) Y i is GDP per worker in country i, Li
u, Li
s,a n d
Ki are per-worker inputs of unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital, Ai
u is the e±ciency
of unskilled labor in country i, Ai
s is the e±ciency of skilled labor, and Ai
k is the e±ciency





Equation (1) is a fairly general speci¯cation of the production process. It allows
skilled and unskilled labor to be imperfect substitutes, and { even more importantly { it
allows technological change to augment unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital di®erently.
The imperfect substitutability of the two labor aggregates and the di®erential e®ect of tech-
nologies on them accord well with the wide changes in the skill premum that have recently
been observed in the US and many other countries. The widely popular Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function is nested in (1) as the special case in which both ¾ and ½ tend to 0. Equation
(1) also allows for one of the labor aggregates to be more complementary with capital than
the other. Speci¯cally, if ¾>½then this production function exhibits capital-skill comple-
mentarity, in the sense that a rise in the capital stock raises the marginal productivity of
4skilled labor more than it raises the marginal productivity of unskilled labor.4
Assume that production of output takes place in perfectly competitive markets. Then
in each country the marginal productivity of capital must equal ri, which is the real interest
rate plus the rate of depreciation on physical capital:
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Furthermore, from the condition that each of the two wage rates, wi
s and wi
u,e q u a l st h e




















Given data on labor endowments, output, and factor prices for a given country, and a choice
of the parameters ¾ and ½, equations (1), (2) and (3) constitute a system of 3 equations in
the 3 unknowns Ai
u;A i
s and Ai
k.5 Essentially, then, for a given speci¯cation of the production
function, along with observations for output (GDP), the inputs into production (unskilled
labor, skilled labor, and capital), and prices (the skilled wage premium and the real interest
rate), we determine the e±ciency of each input such that a model with perfectly competitive
markets is consistent with all these observations. Solving this system for each of a sample of
countries allows one to examine the observed cross-country relationship among the relative
e±ciencies of unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital.6
4Capital-skill complementarity has long been recognized as a potential feature of the production function.
A considerable body of plant- or industry-level evidence exists to support this conjecture. See, e.g., Griliches
(1969), Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000), Dunne,
Haltiwanger and Troske (1997), Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997), and Caselli (1999). Flug and Hercowitz
(2000) ¯nd evidence of capital-skill complementarity in cross-country data. We will see below that in our
preferred estimates ¾ and ½ are approximately equal, which is inconsistent with capital-skill complementarity.
The di®erent result may be due to the fact that our K is total capital, while these studies focus on equipment.
























w + r(K=Y )Lu=Ls
w + Lu=Ls
¶
6Diamond, McFadden, and Rodriguez (1978) show that time-varying (country-varying) elasticities of
substitution cannot be separately identi¯ed from time-varying (country-varying) e±ciency parameters. We
52.2 The Data
Data for Y i and Ki are obtained from Hall and Jones (1999): Y i is GDP per worker in
international dollars (i.e. PPP adjusted) and Ki is an estimate of the real per-worker capital
stock obtained through a version of the perpetual-inventory method. The underlying data for
both series come from Summers and Heston (1991). In order to construct Li
u and Li
s we use
data collected by Barro and Lee (1993). The data break down the population of each country
into seven categories: no education, some primary, completed primary education, some
secondary, completed secondary education, some higher, and completed higher education.
Our baseline experiments construct Li
u as an aggregate of workers with no education and
with some primary education, while Li
s includes all other groups. Hence, we treat basic
literacy as the key requirement for relatively skilled-labor complementary technologies. This
particular choice does not turn out to be critical. We also perform many of our computations
by including in Li
u all workers with less than high-school completed, and we ¯nd no major
change in results.7 The data for Y i and Ki are for the year 1988, while the data for Li
s and
Li
u are for 1985.
To construct cross-country data for wi
s=wi
u we use the Mincerian coe±cients collected
by Bils and Klenow (1998). The Bils and Klenow data report the coe±cient from regressing
log-wages on schooling years. This number can be interpreted as the percentage wage gain
associated with an extra year spent in school. Hence, if ¯i is the Mincerian rate of return,
and n is the di®erence in schooling years between workers in Li
s and Li
u,w ee s t i m a t ewi
s=wi
u
as exp(¯in).8 Finally, there is no reliable cross-country data on ri. We therefore assume that
follow the literature (e.g. Weitzman, 1970, Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante, 2000) in getting
around this by assuming that ¾ and ½ do not vary across countries. Du®y and Papageorgiou (2000) show
that a CES speci¯cation ¯ts the cross-country data better than a Cobb-Douglas, but they also present
some evidence that elasticities of substitution vary across countries. However, their speci¯cation di®ers
considerably from ours, as theirs features only two inputs, and factor-neutral technology di®erences.
7In constructing the Li
u and Li
s aggregates there arises the problem of the weights to be assigned to the
educational achievement sub-categories. How many more units of e±ciency does a worker with a college
education contribute to Li
s relative to a worker with a high-school diploma? There is no entirely satisfying
solution to this problem. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) give equal weight to all categories, but this seems
unrealistic. As we describe below we have country-level data on the returns to one extra year of education,
so we weigh education sub-groups by combining these data with unpublished country-level data on length
in years of each schooling level (collected by Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee). This amounts to assuming




8When we measure Li
u by the bottom two educational sub-groups (no education or some primary) we
6physical capital is perfectly mobile across countries, so that there is a common world gross
rate of return r. We set this common interest rate to the historically relevant value of 0:12.
We report below on a robustness check using alternative data in which ri sharply declines





u; this dataset is reproduced in Table A1.
Table 1 reports some basic statistics from the data set. In this sample of countries
output per worker in the richest country is 19 times higher than that in the poorest country.
The ratio of the supply of skilled workers to unskilled workers ranges from 0.32 to 36.11.
Hence, our construction of the two labor aggregates implies a wide variation in the fraction
of skilled vs. unskilled workers around the world. As for the skilled wage premium, in some
countries skilled workers receive only a 10 percent higher wage rate than unskilled workers,
whereas in other countries skilled workers receive over 3 times as much as a typical unskilled
woker. Note also that, as expected, output is strongly positively correlated with both capital
and the relative supply of skilled labor. As Bils and Klenow have documented, output is
negatively correlated with the skilled wage premium. Not surprisingly, then, the relative
supply of skilled labor is negatively correlated with the skilled wage premium. Finally, the
skilled-labor wage bill relative to the unskilled-labor wage bill is positively correlated with
output, an observation we will build upon in the next section.
2.3 Results
Table 2 summarizes the results of computing e±ciency levels for unskilled labor, skilled labor,
and capital with the methodology and data described above. The exercise is repeated for a
wide range of values of ¾ and ½, and each row of the table corresponds to a particular choice
of these parameters.
The second, third, and fourth columns report cross-country correlations among Au,
As,a n dAk. The striking ¯nding from Table 2 is that for almost all choices of ¾ and ½ at
least one of the correlations between the e±ciencies of the di®erent inputs is negative, and
large in absolute value. For moderately high values of ¾ countries that use unskilled labor
e±ciently also appear to use skilled labor e±ciently. However, they use capital relatively
set n = 4, because this is the shortest duration of primary school across the countries in the sample. This
might seem a small number but keep in mind that { by the aggregation procedure described in the previous
footnote { Li
u and Li
s are in units of workers with no schooling and with just a primary school diploma,
respectively. When we include all groups with less than a high-school diploma in Li
u the two aggregates are
in units of workers with a primary and a secondary school diploma, respectively, and n =5 .
7ine±ciently. For anything less than moderately high values of ¾, instead, countries that are
e±cient at using unskilled labor are ine±cient at using both skilled labor and capital. We
view this overwhelming prevalence of negative correlations as suggestive of the existence of
a Technology Frontier. Along this frontier increases in the e±ciency of one input come at
the cost of losses of e±ciency of another input.9
In the rest of the paper we develop and estimate a simple model of technology choice
that rationalizes these ¯ndings. As prelude and motivation for some of our modeling choices,
the last two columns of Table 2 report additional results that highlight important features of
the data. In the sixth column we report the correlation between ln(Ai
s=Ai
u), and the relative
supplies of the two labor types, ln(Li
s=Li
u). For all values of ¾>0( ¾<0) we ¯nd a strong
positive (negative) relationship: the relative e±ciency of skilled labor is strongly positively
related to the relative supply of skilled workers if the skilled-unskilled elasticity is less than
1( ¾>0), and negatively if the elasticity is greater than 1 (¾<0). Either way, this result
suggests to us that the heterogeneity in technology uncovered in Table 2 is driven by factor
supplies, and supports the choice of an appropriate technology model.
In the last column (denoted \Frac. Dom.") is the fraction of countries that use a
technology that is dominated by the technology of at least one other country in the sample.
Country i0s technology is dominated by country j0si fAi
z <A j
z for every z (= u;s;k). The
fraction of countries using dominated technologies varies considerably with the values of ¾
and ½ (from 14 to 79 percent for the values in Table 2). It is clear that only rarely we observe
the pattern implied by the TFP approach, whereby all countries but one use less-than-best
practice technologies. This further supports an appropriate technology explanation. On the
other hand, it is clear that several countries do use inferior technologies. A simple model of
technology choice where all countries have access to the same set of technologies would fail
to capture this important feature of the data. Hence, the model we propose below features
potential country-speci¯c barriers to technology adoption.
9Are there values of ¾ and ½ that seem more relevant than others? The only estimate that we are aware
of is due to Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) who place ¾ at 0:36 and ½ at ¡0:67. With these
numbers we have that Corr(Au;A s)=¡:27, Corr(Au;A k)=¡:31, and Corr(As;A k)=:11. These estimates
of ¾ and ½, however, are obtained from US time series data, they are based on a college vs. high-school
criterion for construction of Lu and Ls (while our assi¯cation is based on basic literacy), and they include
only equipment as capital (while our ¯gures incluse equipment and structures). Hence, it is not obvious that
these particular numbers are necessarily relevant for our purposes.
83 Endogenous Choice of Technology
In this section we lay out a simple model in which ¯rms in a given country choose from
a \menu" of available technologies (blueprints) the one that maximizes their pro¯ts given
factor prices. This model is consistent with the facts of Table 2. Estimating this model
allows us to: (i) obtain an estimate of the parameters ¾ and ½, so that it is possible to
determine which particular row of Table 2 is the empirically relevant one; (ii) characterize
the set of technologies available to each country in the sample; and (iii) obtain quantitative
measures of the role of barriers to technology adoption in explaining cross-country income
di®erences.
3.1 The Model
We continue to assume that in each country competitive ¯rms obtain output according to the
production function (1). Capital continues to move freely across countries so that the ¯rst
order conditions (2) and (3) for optimal choices of capital and labor inputs must still hold.




k as given, each ¯rm in country i faces a menu of feasible (As;A u;A k) triples.
We have in mind ¯rms choosing from a set of available blueprints, where each blueprint
describes a particular method of obtaining output from skilled labor, unskilled labor, and
capital. Di®erent methods imply di®erent values for the triple (As;A u;A k). For example, a
¯rm might produce cars in an assembly line operated by blue-collar workers wielding hand
tools; or in a computer-controlled plant mainly operated by engineers. The former technology
might be expected to imply relatively high Au and low As and Ak; the latter, low Au and
high As and Ak.
Because (at a given point in time) scienti¯c and technical knowledge are not unlimited,
the set of available blueprints is bounded. The size of the set is further reduced if a country
faces additional barriers (e.g. institutional or cultural) to technology adoption. Formally, this
m e a n st h a tt h es e to ff e a s i b l e( As;A u;A k) combinations is bounded. We therefore describe




























0 > 0, ai
1 > 0, bi
0 > 0, bi
1 > 0. On the boundary of the feasible menu
(the technology frontier) technologies involve a trade-o® between unskilled labor and skilled
9labor and between unskilled labor and capital. Clearly, no ¯rm will choose a dominated
technology so combinations of (As;A u;A k)t h a ta r en o to nt h ef r o n t i e ra r ei r r e l e v a n t .N o t i c e
that the parameters of the frontier are country-speci¯c (except !): we do this to allow for
country-speci¯c barriers to technology adoption.
Since equations (4)-(5) describe monotonic relations between As and Au and between
Ak and Au, the optimal choice of technology is found by maximizing pro¯ts with respect to





















This condition says that at an optimum a unit increase in Ai
u has no e®ect on output: the
increase through larger e±ciency of unskilled workers (left hand side) is completely o®set by
the corresponding decline through lower e±ciency of skilled workers and capital.
Using the ¯rst order conditions with respect to Li
u, Li






























To interpret this equation, it helps to think of two special cases. Suppose, ¯rst, that bi
1 =0 .
Recall that ai
1 > 0a n d!>0. This relationship then says that in equilibrium countries with
a relatively large skilled-labor wage bill will tend to choose relatively skill-complementary
technologies. Countries that have a large relative cost of production due to skilled labor
(the skilled labor wage bill) will ¯nd it advantageous to implement technologies that save on
skilled labor. Recall that, as shown in Table 1, rich countries tend to have a large fraction of
their wage bill going to skilled labor (as measured by wsLs=wuLu) { even though they have a
low skill premium (as measured by ws=wu). For the other special case, suppose that ai
1 =0 .
Recall here that bi
1 > 0a n d!>0. In this case this relationship says that in equilibrium
countries with a relatively large expense due to capital will tend to choose technologies that
raise the relative e±ciency of their capital stock. The intermediate case in which ai
1 > 0a n d
bi
1 > 0 is then some combination of these two cases.10
10The existence of a solution to the ¯rm's problem, and hence of an equilibrium given a world interest rate,
follows from the continuity of the objective function and compactness of the constraint set. The uniqueness
of a solution may depend on values of the parameters of the model. Indeed, for some parameter values the
objective function as it depends on Ai
u (using eqs. (4) and (5) to substitute out Ai
s and Ai
k)m a yb e c o m e
convex over some range. We have checked (numerically) that at the estimated parameter values the solution
is indeed a global optimum and is unique.
103.2 Estimation of the Model
We now turn the theoretical model into a statistical model in order to obtain estimates of
the unknown parameters. We assume that the country-speci¯c parameters of the technology




























§ is unrestricted. Hence, there are \average" values of the parameters of the technology fron-
tier { de¯ning an \average" World Technology Frontier { but individual countries' frontiers
may di®er from the average one because they have di®erential access (or di®erential ability
to implement) the various best practices. Notice that we have assumed that deviations from
the average frontier (i.e. realizations of "'s) are known to ¯rms at the time of their choice of
technology. However, they are not observed by the econometrician.
We estimate this model by maximum likelihood. Given values of ¾ and ½ equations
(1)-(3) imply values of Ai
u, Ai
s,a n dAi
k ( a sw eh a v es e e ni nS e c t i o n2 ) . T h e s e ,i nt u r n ,
together with choices of the remaining parameters, can be plugged into equations (4) and
(5) (which hold with equality), and (7) to back out the "0s.W i t ht h e"0s at hand, one can
construct the log-likelihood for that particular choice of parameters.11
3.3 Results
Maximum Likelihood estimates for the parameters of interest are reported in Table 3. The
point estimate of ¾ is :24, and that of ½ is :25. Hence, at the estimated parameter values
the model does not exhibit capital-skill complementarity. As noted above, we conjecture
that this ¯nding might re°ect the inclusion of structures in the capital stock. Most of the
parameters are estimated relatively precisely.
11Our approach to modeling the frontier is close in spirit to the literature on frontier production functions
in empirical production economics (see Greene (1997) for an especially useful survey). The di±culties
associated with extending that approach to a setting with non-factor neutral technology di®erences dictates
our focus on an \average" { as opposed to \global" { frontier.
11Figure 3 plots against each other the realized levels of the e±ciency of skilled labor
(Ai
s) and unskilled labor (Ai
u), as implied by our estimates of ¾ and ½.T h i s r e p r o d u c e s
graphically the negative association already uncovered in (the relevant row of) Table 2. The
¯gure also draws the average frontier, as given by equation (4), with ²i
s = "i
u =0 ,g i v e nt h e
estimated values of a0, a1,a n d!.F i g u r e4d o e st h es a m ef o rt h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nAi
k
and Ai
u.H e r ew ec a ns e eg r a p h i c a l l yt h ee s t i m a t e dt r a d e o ®a m o n gt h ee ± c i e n c yl e v e l so ft h e
various factors of production. As discussed above, no individual country's technology lies on
the average frontier, as barriers to technology adoption vary from country to country. But
each country's technology lies on that country's frontier. To illustrate, we have also plotted
some sample frontiers for a few representative countries (in Fig. 3 the ordering of the lines,
from bottom to top, is Average, US, Hong Kong; in Fig. 4 the ordering is US, Average,
Italy).
Having estimated the model allows us to quantitatively investigate the importance
of appropriate technology. In order to do so we perform the following experiments. In the
¯rst experiment we ask what would be a country's output (given its labor endowments) if it
had access to the technological menu of the US. Speci¯cally, we compute the level of GDP
associated with an appropriate choice of technology on the US technology frontier. We then
compare this number with the level of GDP the same country would have if forced to use the
technology of the United States. In other words, for each country we compare two points on
the US technology frontier: the one corresponding to that country's optimal choice, and the
one corresponding to the optimal choice of the US. The result of this experiment is plotted in
Figure 5, where the vertical axis measures the ratio of US-technology GDP to appropriate-
technology (on US frontier) GDP; and the horizontal axis measures actual per-capita output.
As can be seen, the adoption of an inappropriate technology involves very large output
losses { up to 50% of GDP { the more so the more di®erent the levels of development (and
hence factor endowments). A similar experiment, with a similar message, is reported in
Figure 6. Here, instead of comparing points on the US frontier, we compare points on the
average frontier. For country i the vertical axis measures GDP at US-appropriate technology
(on the average frontier) as a ratio of GDP at country i-appropriate technology (on the
average frontier). Again, forcing countries to deviate from their appropriate technology
causes spectacular output losses.
Our method assumes that each country uses the optimal (appropriate) technology
from the set of technologies that are available to it, i.e. each country is on its own tech-
nology frontier. However, we have allowed for idiosyncratic factors that cause the set of
12available technologies to di®er across countries. We think of these factors as barriers to tech-
nology adoption. Since we have implicitly estimated each country's own frontier, we can also
investigate the quantitative importance of such barriers. Figure 7 compares each country's
observed level of GDP with the level of GDP that country would obtain if it had access
to the US technology frontier. Hence, we now compare two points on di®erent technology
frontiers: the one corresponding to that country's optimal choice on the US frontier, and the
one corresponding to its optimal choice on its own frontier. Both points are \appropriate,"
but they are conditional on di®erent choice sets. The Figure shows staggering e®ects from
barriers to technology adoption, with output increasing by up to a factor of 7 if such barriers
were removed. Figure 8 shows that the barriers are very severe even just to reach the average
frontier: just by obtaining access to the average frontier countries can obtain output gains
of up to a factor of 4.
It is clear from the last two ¯gures that poor countries tend to disproportionately be
the ones that would gain the most by having access to the technological menu of the US,
or indeed the technological menu of the average country. Hence, there is clearly support
for the standard view according to which poor countries are generally inside the \world"
technology frontier. This ¯nding calls for a more general framework that nests the models
in which some countries are pushed to use less-than-best-practice technologies by barriers to
technology adoption, together with the present framework of appropriate technology. This
is a challenging problem that is beyond the scope of the present paper.
An additional perspective on the relationship between appropriate technology and
barriers to technology adoption can be obtained by computing the fraction of the cross-
country variation of per-capita income that would be explained by a deterministic model
of appropriate-technology adoption, in which all countries had access to the same set of
potential technologies. For example, if each country could choose the point on the average
frontier that maximizes its output { given its labor endowments { the standard deviation
of the log of per capita GDP would be 0.26. This compares to a value of 0.8 in the data.
Hence, di®erences in inputs explain only little more than a quarter of the observed disparity
of incomes, with the rest explained by barriers to technology adoption { i.e. by the fact that
di®erent countries have di®erent frontiers.
As discussed in the Introduction, models in which technological choice is factor neu-
tral, such as the Cobb-Douglas model, lead to a roughly 50-50 split of the responsibility
for the variation of income between factor endowments and di®erences in technology. It
may therefore seem paradoxical that a model of appropriate technology attributes an even
13smaller share of the overall variation to di®erences in endowments. But in fact this result is
not surprising: when countries are allowed to choose optimally from a menu of technologies,
this optimal choice will dampen, and not exacerbate, the e®ect of di®erences in endowment
on di®erences in income. In a way, therefore, our results deepen the puzzle of the great
dispersion of per-capita income around the world, and make it even more important that we
understand deviations from best practice at the country level.
Before concluding, we return to the properties of the estimated technology frontier.
Figures 9 and 10 present characteristics of countries that chose di®erent technologies. Figure
9 shows that countries with a large labor bill for skilled labor relative to their labor bill for
unskilled labor tend to be those countries that adopted a technology more complementary
to skilled labor (their skilled-labor e±ciency level is relatively high). Figure 10 shows that
countries with a large capital expense (rK) relative to their unskilled wage bill are coun-
tries that adopted a technology more complementary to capital (their capital e±ciency level
is relatively high). Both results are consistent with our model of appropriate-technology
adoption.
As a ¯nal check, Figure 11 graphs the relationship between the wage rates for unskilled
and skilled labor implied by our data set. It is surely the case that both skilled and unskilled
wage rates are higher in rich countries than in poor countries, and the Figure shows that our
data are consistent with this fact. This is especially notable for the unskilled wage, since we
have estimated rich countries to have the least e±cient unskilled labor. The explanation is
that this ine±ciency is more than compensated by complementarity with skilled labor and
capital, which are more abundant in rich countries, as well as the relatively low supply of
unskilled workers in rich countries. Figure 11 also shows that there is no problem reconciling
the fact that rich countries have the lowest skilled wage premium but also the highest skilled
wage rate.12
12An alternative interpretation of some of our results is that the e±ciencies Ai
s and Ai
u are exogenous
and factor supplies respond endogenously. In this view high values of ln(Ai
s=Ai
u) lead to large relative wages
for skilled workers, and hence to greater investment in human capital. However, as shown in Table 1,
ln(Li
s=Li
u)a n dl n ( wi
s=wi
u) are negatively correlated: countries in which skilled workers are relatively e±cient
generally have a low skilled-wage premium. It does not appear that relative labor supplies are driven only
by incentives. This result is also consistent with the related ¯ndings of Caselli and Coleman (1999) on US
wages and relative labor supplies over the last century.
144 Robustness
One restrictive assumption we have employed is undoubtedly that the cost of acquiring
capital goods in units of consumption goods is equalized across countries (or that the required
rate of return to capital is higher for some countries, which has a similar e®ect). If the cost




We computed pi from the Summers and Heston (1991) dataset as the ratio of the price of
investment goods to the price of consumption goods in 1988. Clearly this price will also be
a®ected by the fact that not all countries purchase the same kinds of capital (or consumption),
but we will nevertheless use it here as an estimate of di®erences in the relative price of the
same capital good. The value of this price generally falls with per-capita income, and ranges
from 2.26 for Kenya to .79 for France (the value for the U.S. is .81).13 When using this price
data, the correlations between the estimated e±ciency levels for various values of ¾ and ½
exhibit the same pattern of positive and negative values as does Table 2, and mostly the
numbers are not substantially di®erent. We also re-estimated the model using this relative
price data. All the graphs exhibit the same relationships as the ones that are reported.
The main di®erence is in the value of the estimated parameters. The estimated value of
¾ = :31 and ½ = ¡1:39, hence the model with these parameter estimates exhibits capital-
skill complementarity. The central message of our paper concerning the properties of a
Technology Frontier, though, are unaltered.
5 Conclusions
The main message of this paper is that there seems to exist a World Technology Frontier.
Points on this frontier represent a menu of best practice technologies. Along the frontier
countries trade o® the e±ciency with which di®erent inputs are used. A model in which
countries optimally choose an appropriate technology from this menu was used to identify
this frontier. In this model, countries with relatively large endowments of skilled labor,
and consequently large skilled-labor wage bills, ¯nd it optimal to adopt a technology that
makes skilled labor and capital relatively more e±cient. Countries for which unskilled labor
13Hence the implied estimate of ri varies from .27 to .09. This alternative estimate has the intuitive
property that the cost of capital is much higher in poor countries than in rich ones.
15represents a large fraction of their workforce ¯nd it optimal to adopt less sophisticated
technologies (and accumulate less capital). In sum, choice of technology and capital-stock
levels are driven by human capital endowments.
Yet some features of the results suggest that the appropriate technology view of the
World adopted in this paper is complementary, not alternative, to the standard view of
technological backwardness, in which poor countries are poor because they are a²icted by
barriers to technology adoption. Poor countries do generally choose technologies that are
inside the technology frontier of rich countries. Hence, the challenge for future progress in
this ¯eld is to develop a framework that nests both mechanisms. A complementary area for
future research is the source of cross-country di®erences in skill levels.
As virtually all papers in this literature, our work rests on very restrictive aggregation
assumptions. A legitimate question is whether these restrictions are driving some of our
results. Answering this question would involve studying a multi-good version of the model
in this paper, and work out the implications for factor-speci¯c e±ciency levels. This is a
complex task that is beyond the scope of the present paper. A priori, however, we see no
obvious reason why our aggregation assumption would bias our estimates towards ¯nding a
negative cross-country correlation between the e±ciencies of di®erent factors. On the other
hand, a potentially fruitful way to interpret the frontier we identify is not that countries are
faced with di®erent ways of producing the same good, but rather that goods may di®er in
the relative e±ciency of di®erent factors. Countries abundant in skilled labor may then tend
to specialize in the production of goods that use skilled labor e±ciently, etc. This would
provide our model of appropriate technology with roots in the Heckscher-Ohlin tradition.14
Again, whether or not this is a useful way to interpret our ¯ndings will have to await results
on computing e±ciency levels of various factors for a variety of goods, and relating this to
cross-country production patterns, but this seems a worthwhile project.
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24Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Data
variable mean std.dev. minimum maximum
output 13506 9717 1854 35440
capital 32271 28994 1218 107900
Ls=Lu 2.93 5.52 .32 36.11
ws=wu 1.50 .33 1.10 3.16
wsLs=wuLu 4.14 7.86 .52 53.45
correlation matrix
log output log capital log Ls=Lu log ws=wu log wsLs=wuLu
log output 1.0000
log capital 0.9567 1.0000
log Ls=Lu 0.7555 0.7808 1.0000
log ws=wu -0.3781 -0.3244 -0.3410 1.0000
log wsLs=wuLu 0.7197 0.7566 0.9834 -0.1648 1.0000








0.5 0.25 0.298 -0.188 -0.098 0.895 0.75
0.5 0.05 0.186 -0.106 -0.882 0.333 0.442
0.5 -0.25 0.149 0.014 -0.554 0.753 0.635
0.5 -0.5 0.199 -0.037 -0.286 0.838 0.692
0.5 -0.75 0.216 -0.073 -0.141 0.864 0.692
0.5 -5 0.245 -0.198 0.258 0.9 0.788
0.25 0.5 -0.555 -0.735 0.785 0.967 0.635
0.25 0.25 -0.519 -0.586 0.428 0.970 0.635
0.25 0.05 -0.138 -0.261 -0.759 0.789 0.308
0.25 -0.25 -0.532 -0.298 -0.095 0.923 0.365
0.25 -0.5 -0.556 -0.506 0.325 0.943 0.423
0.25 -0.75 -0.562 -0.596 0.5 0.949 0.481
0.25 -5 -0.566 -0.735 0.773 0.957 0.615
0.05 0.5 -0.849 -0.849 0.989 0.976 0.231
0.05 0.25 -0.849 -0.835 0.966 0.977 0.288
0.05 -0.25 -0.836 -0.837 0.921 0.971 0.135
0.05 -0.5 -0.842 -0.851 0.968 0.972 0.231
0.05 -0.75 -0.844 -0.853 0.978 0.973 0.25
0.05 -5 -0.845 -0.855 0.988 0.973 0.255
-0.25 0.5 -0.589 -0.855 0.773 -0.98 0.558
-0.25 0.25 -0.559 -0.739 0.451 -0.972 0.462
-0.25 0.05 -0.324 -0.064 -0.811 -0.855 0.192
-0.25 -0.5 -0.56 -0.737 0.53 -0.989 0.365
-0.25 -0.75 -0.575 -0.772 0.633 -0.988 0.385
-0.25 -5 -0.591 -0.826 0.77 -0.986 0.442
-0.5 0.5 -0.229 -0.824 0.441 -0.98 0.596
-0.5 0.25 -0.231 -0.561 -0.056 -0.965 0.519
-0.5 0.05 -0.169 0.025 -0.904 -0.746 0.231
-0.5 -0.25 -0.088 -0.511 -0.323 -0.989 0.442
-0.5 -0.75 -0.166 -0.683 0.185 -0.993 0.5
-0.5 -5 -0.196 -0.781 0.418 -0.99 0.519
26Table 3: Estimated Parameter Values
parameter value std.err. description
¾ .240 .074 prod. curvature parm.
½ .252 .072 prod. curvature parm.
! .317 .128 tech. curvature parm.
a0 2.440 1.208 technology frontier for (Au,As)
a1 .747 .198 technology frontier for (Au,As)
b0 .185 .049 technology frontier for (Au,Ak)
b1 .061 .045 technology frontier for (Au,Ak)
52 number of observations
27Table A.1: Raw Data
country code GDP capital Lu Ls ws=wu
Argentina ARG 14804.7 33151.4 59.9 106.45 1.51
Australia AUS 29858.1 88075.5 17.08 128.79 1.24
Bolivia BOL 4952.5 9076.4 74.91 50.74 1.33
Botswana BWA 3315.8 9884.9 115.07 40.73 2.15
Brazil BRA 11297 21226.6 99.61 61.97 1.8
Canada CAN 33336.9 82442.8 7.04 133.7 1.23
Chile CHL 9323.1 22451.9 72.64 107.74 1.62
China CHN 2123.7 4156.4 64.89 49.85 1.22
Colombia COL 9360.2 15433.7 83.39 76.07 1.75
Costa Rica CRI 9118.2 16695.3 82.61 76.78 1.55
Cyprus CYP 15804.7 37046.2 47.87 143.77 1.55
Dom. Rep. DOM 7314.3 12231.8 84.97 48.74 1.46
Ecuador ECU 8388.1 21190.1 68.52 106.87 1.6
El Salvador SLV 5548.5 5617.3 92.26 38.05 1.47
France FRA 28971.6 84929 45.53 111.7 1.49
Ghana GHA 1853.9 1217.9 83.85 35.24 1.4
Greece GRC 16607.3 42802.4 26.54 85.39 1.11
Guatemala GTM 7430.5 7772.6 98.19 43.36 1.81
Honduras HND 4596.5 6174.7 102.17 74.94 2.02
Hong Kong HKG 21532.3 29127.6 38.21 98.99 1.28
Hungary HUN 10868.9 33857 37.43 88.94 1.19
India IND 3045.7 3775.5 79.29 34.47 1.22
Indonesia IDN 3914.3 8083.8 84.62 72.29 1.97
Israel ISR 23362.3 51767.6 36.53 118.69 1.29
Italy ITA 29552.4 82317.6 42.94 66.22 1.1
Jamaica JAM 4595.5 12830.9 96.17 184.72 3.16
Japan JPN 20807.3 64180.8 27.87 119.16 1.3
Kenya KEN 1997.8 2748.3 108.77 34.46 1.93
Malaysia MYS 9471.6 23542.7 58.8 81.76 1.46
Mexico MEX 15329.6 28448.8 81.22 92.07 1.76
Netherlands NLD 28549.7 79069.3 24.43 127.68 1.34
Nicaragua NIC 4452.8 8762.3 90.85 40.19 1.47
Pakistan PAK 4551.6 3793.2 85.09 30.24 1.47
Panama PAN 7897.9 19793.9 63.3 139.12 1.73
Paraguay PRY 6015.4 9689 87.77 67.7 1.58
Peru PER 8386.6 18075.5 65.24 75.06 1.38
Philippines PHL 4472.8 8042.3 46.46 96.98 1.38
28Table A.1: Raw Data (continued)
country code GDP capital Lu Ls ws=wu
Poland POL 8438.8 33948.8 19.5 98.1 1.12
Portugal PRT 12960.5 29436.8 63.82 59.47 1.49
S. Korea KOR 13483.3 24650.9 28.46 159.26 1.53
Singapore SGP 21470.4 56218.5 71.33 89.34 1.71
Sri Lanka LKA 5476.3 5919.5 51.12 75.99 1.32
Sweden SWE 27886 72777.3 28.28 132.6 1.31
Switzerland CHE 30964.9 107869.8 22.21 142.18 1.37
Taiwan OAN 15787.3 26240 35.82 96.91 1.27
Thailand THA 5557.7 7477.4 86.78 64.52 1.52
Tunisia TUN 7695.7 10823.4 82.32 35.73 1.38
UK GBR 25775.3 50408.8 36.38 115.32 1.31
USA USA 35438.7 87330.1 6.33 228.61 1.48
Uruguay URY 12036.3 23397.6 62.49 96.67 1.47
Venezuela VEN 17529.1 42713.1 69.46 70.71 1.4
W. Germany DEU 28992.2 89368.2 41.19 93.7 1.22
29